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JAMES M. KLEIN**
1. INTRODUCTION
With the enactment of the Employment Promotion Act of 19691
(Promotion Act), the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) adopted a
comprehensive program to promote full employment and combat unem-
ployment. The program contains numerous measures to promote em-
ployment - two of which are related to unemployment insurance.'
The purpose of this article is to provide a general description of the
modern employment promotion system in the FRG with particular em-
phasis upon the unemployment insurance program. In addition, com-
parisons will be drawn between unemployment insurance programs of
the United States and the FRG as they relate to disqualifications and
administrative and judicial review.
Section 2 describes the historical development of the unemploy-
ment insurance program in the FRG. The structure of the Bundesan-
staltflir Arbeit (Bundesanstalt),3 the FRG Federal Employment Insti-
tute, is discussed in Section 3, and the benefits available for the
unemployed are analyzed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, the FRG
and U.S. unemployment insurance programs are compared.
* This article is the result of a three-week visit to the Federal Republic of
Germany in which the author met with key officials who are involved with the
unemployment insurance program. This article is based, in large part, on interviews
with, and documents received from these officials.
** Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.
The author wishes to express his extreme gratitude to Dr. Manfred Lev6 for his
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 Arbeitsf'drderungsgesetz [AFG], 1969 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 582 (W.
Ger.); see also INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, LEGISLATIVE SERIES 1969, FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1 (Nov.-Dec. 1969) (English version); BUNDESANSTALT
FOR ARBEIT, ARBEITSF6RDERUNGSGESETZ TEXTAUSGABE (Feb. 1986) (book prepared
by the Bundesanstaltfdr Arbeit (Bundesanstalt), the FRG Federal Employment In-
stitute, setting forth an updated version of the Promotion Act) (copy on file with the
author).
S The two major programs are the Unemployment Benefit, AFG §§ 100-133, and
Unemployment Assistance, AFG §§ 134-141 programs.
S The Bundesanstalt is an autonomous legal entity which administers the em-
ployment program (including unemployment insurance) in the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG). See AFG § 3(1).
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2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before examining the present unemployment insurance program
in the FRG, it would be beneficial to understand its historical develop-
ment. The predecessor of the Bundesanstalt was the National Office
for Placement and Unemployment Insurance (National Office), a self-
governing body created by the Placement and Unemployment Insur-
ance Act of 1927." This agency was responsible for the administration
of a placement service and compulsory unemployment insurance as well
as public vocational guidance and placement of apprentices.' Due to the
Great Depression of 1929-1932, however, the National Office was una-
ble to accumulate reserves for its unemployment insurance fund and
thus was unable to cope with the enormous financial hardship caused
by increasing mass unemployment throughout the FRG.6 The various
functions of the National Office were reduced to merely supporting the
millions of unemployed with monetary assistance.7
With the advent of the National Socialist regime in 1933, trade
unions and employers' organizations were disbanded and the self-ad-
ministrative status of the National Office was abolished.' The constitu-
tionally mandated free choice of profession and place of work was se-
verely limited and in 1935 centralized government control of labor was
declared an integral part of the national program.' In 1939, the Na-
tional Office was incorporated into the National Ministry of Labor.10
The effect of this nationalization was to increase the power of employ-
ers and to severely diminish the rights of workers.
After World War II, steps were initiated to return the placement
service and unemployment insurance program to a self-governing insti-
tution."' The trade unions and employers' groups wanted to be the only
representatives on the governing board of the institution.2 The Estab-
lishment of a Federal Office for Placement and Unemployment Insur-
ance Act of 1952,13 however, required equal representation of employ-
' Gesetz fiber Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, 1927 Reich-
sgesetzblatt 1 187 (W. Ger.).
5 BUNDESANSTALT FOR ARBEIT, FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT SERVICES: THE LOCAL
EMPLOYMENT OFFICE 8 (1984) (pamphlet detailing the structure and function of the
Bundesanstalt) (copy on file with the author) [hereinafter 1984 REPORT].
O Id.
7Id.
S Id. at 9.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
1" Gesetz fiber die Errichtung einer Bundesanstalt fufr Arbeitsvermittlung und
Arbeitslosenversicherung, 1952 BGBI 1 123 (W. Ger.).
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ers, employees and public agencies. 4  The rationale for this
requirement was that the intended functions of the Federal Office were
to go well beyond the administration of unemployment insurance and
were to include a public placement service and vocational guidance."'
In 1969, the Placement and Unemployment Insurance Act was re-
placed by the Promotion Act, which redefined the statutory mandate of
the Bundesanstalt. In addition to offering vocational guidance, a place-
ment service and an unemployment insurance program, the Bundesan-
stalt was entrusted with the promotion of vocational training."' The
democratically organized Bundesanstalt has developed into a versatile
and effective agency, which administers unemployment insurance as
only one of its many functions to assist the unemployed.
3. ORGANIZATION OF THE Bundesanstalt
In the United States, unemployment insurance is administered by
the U.S. Department of Labor which certifies individual plans submit-
ted by each state.17 In the FRG, unemployment insurance and other
employment programs are administered by the Bundesanstalt, a legal
entity that, in principle, is governed and administered independently
from the federal government.18 The national headquarters of the
Bundesanstalt is in Nuremberg,"9 with nine regional employment of-
fices, 146 local employment offices and approximately 500 branch of-
fices throughout the FRG.2 0 At the national, regional and local levels,
14 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
is Id.
is AFG § 3.
17 The unemployment insurance program in the United States is a cooperative
federal-state effort to provide assistance for unemployed workers. The Social Security
Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1982 & Supp. I 1983), provides for federal fund-
ing for unemployment insurance programs with various requirements covering state
eligibility for such funding. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3311 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), imposes a duty on states to tax employers at
prescribed rates to establish a fund for the payment of benefits to eligible workers.
FUTA also directs the states to enact certain statutes regarding eligibility for unem-
ployment insurance benefits. The federal government performs a supervisory role
through a statutory system that provides for grants to state programs and tax credits to
employers in states certified by the Secretary of Labor as having complied with federal
standards set out in FUTA. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3302, 3304. For a brief description of
the operation of FUTA, see California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 396-
98 (1981). The actual administration of unemployment insurance, however, is carried
out by individual states pursuant to state statutes and regulations. See W. HABER &
M. MURRAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 106-23
(1966).
18 AFG § 3.
19 Id. § 189(1).
20 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
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there are separate governing bodies comprised of representatives from
labor, management and government.21 The central organs of the
Bundesanstalt are the Verwaltungsrat (Administrative Council) and
the Vorstand (Executive Board).22 The regional and local offices are
governed by Verwaltungsausschfisse (Administrative Committees).2"
21 AFG § 192.
22 The Verwaltungsrat is composed of 39 members - 13 each from employers,
labor organizations and governments. The Verwaltungsrat recommends legislation to
the federal legislature and determines its budget. It also promulgates by-laws pursuant
to which the Bundesanstalt administers the Promotion Act. The Verwaltungsrat also
issues regulations in accordance with the Promotion Act; the regulations define the
benefits and services rendered by the Bundesanstalt. For example, with regard to un-
employment insurance, the Verwaltungsrat promulgates regulations pertaining to eligi-
bility requirements for the submission of claims and the benefit procedure. All such
regulations are subject to the approval of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs.
The Vorstand is the executive organ of the Bundesanstalt. The Vorstand, com-
prised of nine members - three each from employers, labor groups and public authori-
ties, represents the Bundesanstalt in court as well as extra-judicially in those cases
where the tasks do not fall under the responsibility of the President of the Bundesan-
stalt. The Vorstand also issues directives concerning routine administration. The Vor-
stand prepares a budget which is submitted for approval by the Verwaltungsrat and
the federal government. Id. § 216(2). The Vorstand also plays an important role in
deciding upon the appointment of key Bundesanstalt staff positions. Finally, the Vor-
stand of the Bundesanstalt is responsible for the administration and investment of the
Bundesanstalt funds. No individual can serve simultaneously on the Verwaltungsrat
and the Vorstand.
The two leading Bundesanstalt positions - President and Vice-President - are
appointed by the President of the Federal Republic upon recommendation of the fed-
eral government. Id. § 211(1). As a practical matter, the President is bound by the
recommendation. The federal government, in turn, must consult the Verwaltungsrat of
the Bundesanstalt before submitting a recommendation for the President and Vice-
President of the Bundesanstalt. Id. § 211(1), (2). The President of the Bundesanstalt
represents the Bundesanstalt in court and elsewhere and is responsible for carrying out
the day-to-day administrative business of the Bundesanstalt. Any restriction of these
duties must be stipulated through by-laws duly enacted by the Vorstand.
Legal supervision of the Bundesanstalt is the responsibility of the Federal Minis-
try of Labor and Social Affairs. The Ministry ensures the Bundesanstalt's compliance
with all laws and other legal directives and is responsible for reviewing the annual
report of the Bundesanstalt.
IS The Verwaltungsausschi.sse perform the functions of self-government in the
state or regional employment offices (REO) and the local employment offices (LEO).
The administrative committees of the nine REOs are comprised of at least five repre-
sentatives each from employers, employee groups and regional government. The admin-
istrative committees of the LEOs have at least three representatives each from employ-
ers, employee groups and local government. These committees assume the duties of self-
government for their respective districts. Within these limits, they deal with everything
concerning the execution of functions of the Bundesanstalt. They ensure that the spe-
cialized functions, such as unemployment insurance, placement, vocational guidance,
promotion of vocational training and administration are carried out in compliance with
the Promotion Act and regulations. The committees are also consulted in the prepara-
tion of individual budgets for their respective offices.
Each REO has a President and Vice-President, who are appointed by the Presi-
dent of the FRG upon the recommendation of the federal government. Id. § 211(1).
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3.1. Funding of the Bundesanstalt
The Bundesanstalt collects contributions from employers and em-
ployees in order to carry out its functions. Requiring an equal contri-
bution rate for both,2 4 the Promotion Act defines which employers and
employees are liable for contributions and which are exempt.25 In addi-
tion, the Promotion Act prescribes the rate of contribution.26 In 1969,
the contribution rate was one percent of the "basis for assessment.
27
Today it is four percent of the basis for assessment.28 For most employ-
ees, the basis is linked to the basis for contributions to the statutory
pension scheme; an employer's basis is the aggregate of all of its em-
ployees' bases.29
3.2. Budget of the Bundesanstalt
The Bundesanstalt has its own budget, which is prepared and
initially approved by the Vorstand and the VerwaltungsratY' Input
from the regional and local offices is sought and considered. Ultimately
the budget must be approved by the federal government."' Any budget
surplus is transferred to the reserve fund and budget deficits are cov-
ered by corresponding withdrawals from the reserve fund. 2 If the defi-
cit cannot be secured from existing contributions and the reserve fund
(as was the case in 1975, 1976, and since 1980), the federal government
loans funds to the Bundesanstalt.33 If the loan, which is equal to the
The directors of the LEOs are appointed by the Vorstand upon recommendation of the
President of the Bundesanstalt after consultation with the administrative committees of
both the REOs and the LEOs. Id. § 212(1), (2).
24 Id. § 167.
2' Generally, persons employed as wage earners and persons employed for the
purpose of receiving vocational training are subject to compulsory contribution. Id. §
168(1). However, The Promotion Act does provide for statutory exemptions under Sec-
tion 169 and allows for the promulgation of regulations which create additional exemp-
tions under Section 173(1). For example, civil servants, students, pensioners, temporary
workers, casual workers and employees over age 63 do not contribute. Id. § 169(1).
26 Id. §§ 167, 174.
'" Id. § 174(1). For a definition of the basis for assessment, see id. § 175.
2' An amendment to AFG Section 174(1) decreased the overall contribution rate
to 4 percent from 4.1 percent, effective January 1, 1986. See Doing Business in Eu-
rope, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 40,661 (Jan. 16, 1986) thereinafter Doing Busi-
ness in Europe]. As of 1987, the unemployment insurance contribution rate increased to
4.3 percent. However, the old-age pension insurance rate decreased by 5 percent (both
rates are applied to the same assessed total) thus resulting in an overall lower contribu-
tion rate. Id. 1 40,709 (Dec. 4, 1986).
29 AFG § 175.
30 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 56.
31 Id.
31 Id.
33 Id.
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amount in the reserve fund, does not cover the deficit, the federal gov-
ernment is authorized by the Constitution to grant a further subsidy." '
3.3. General Scope of Functions of Bundesanstalt
While the emphasis in this article is the administration of unem-
ployment insurance programs, it is important to underscore that there
is no isolated and independent program of financial unemployment in-
surance in the FRG. Payments of unemployment insurance are only
one part of the comprehensive array of measures carried out by the
Bundesanstalt.
The Promotion Act defines the scope and functions of the
Bundesanstalt. Some of the most important functions are:
1. vocational guidance and counseling
5
2. placement,3 6
S4 GRUNDGESETZ art. 120 (W. Ger.).
a AFG §§ 25-32. The Bundesanstalt has sole responsibility for vocational guid-
ance and counseling. It is obligated (1) to advise juveniles and adults on the choice of a
trade or profession prior to their entrance into the job market and (2) to answer ques-
tions regarding professional guidance subsequent to entering employment. This advice
is augmented by information concerning an individual's choice of profession, vocational
training, different occupations and labor market trends. Once a decision as to a vocation
has been made, the guidance service assists in finding training facilities and in provid-
ing financial assistance to ensure vocational training. Vocational guidance services are
made available in the LEOs. There are vocational guidance and counseling depart-
ments in all of the REOs and the LEOs. At the national level, there is a staff of
vocational guidance experts in the Bundesanstalt that oversees the program and imple-
ments national policies.
36 Id. §§ 13-24. Under the Promotion Act, the Bundesanstalt has responsibility
for ensuring that jobseekers obtain employment and that neither unemployment, infer-
ior employment or lack of manpower occurs or continues. The placement function in-
volves both the placement of individual jobseekers and the provision of manpower for
employers. The Promotion Act also designates the Bundesanstalt as the responsible
body for employment guidance. The Bundesanstalt is required to advise employees and
employers about the state of the labor market, trends in trades and professions, pos-
sibilities of vocational training and training incentives.
Utilization of the placement service is voluntary. The guidance and placement ser-
vices are performed with due regard for the constitutional rights of the individual to
equal treatment, freedom of movement, choice of vocation and selection of place of
work. With the exception of certain groups that enjoy special legal protection (e.g., the
handicapped), the Bundesanstalt must be impartial to employees and employers in
carrying out its services. Placement services are free to the individual, however, the
Bundesanstalt may require fees from employers to cover expenses.
The placement service is subdivided by the classification of professions without
regard to gender. The number of classifications vary from district to district. The LEOs
accept applications from jobseekers and vacancies from employers.
The placement system in the FRG differs markedly from the U.S. system in that
private employment agencies play a much lesser role in the FRG. For the most part,
the Bundesanstalt has a monopoly in placement services. The existence of this monop-
oly has been criticized by employers and politicians who contend that the private sector
would be more flexible in dealing with placement activities. While not opposed to cen-
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3. vocational training,3
7
4. granting of allowances for the maintenance and creation of
employment,38
tralization, these individuals believe that the private sector should have more involve-
ment in placement. On the other hand, the trade unions and pro-labor politicians argue
that decentralization of the placement program would be the first step towards creating
a profit-oriented abuse that would be detrimental to the well-founded traditional system
embodied in the Bundesanstalt. Only in exceptional circumstances does the Bundesan-
stalt authorize private organizations or individuals to perform placement functions. Id.
§ 23. For example, the Bundesanstalt has allowed charitable organizations to perform
placement services on a no-charge basis. Additionally, profit-making placement has
been allowed with regard to employment related to the arts (e.g., concert, opera, thea-
ter). Personnel leasing on a fee-basis is allowed only with authorization of the
Bundesanstalt, which monitors compliance to ensure social protection of leased person-
nel. Arbeitnehmeriiberassungsgesetz § 17, 1972 BGB1 1393 (W. Ger.) amended by
1985 BGBI I 1068. However, all authorized placement organizations are subject to
supervision by the Bundesanstalt, which is authorized to promulgate administrative
regulations to oversee the activities of the private agencies. Id. § 23(3).
37 Id. §§ 33-62. The Promotion Act provides for a number of employment promo-
tion programs. The purpose of these incentive vocational training programs is to assist
the jobseeker in acquiring updated vocational training and retraining consistent with
his aptitude and individual goals as well as labor market trends. The Promotion Act
provides that the Bundesanstalt shall perform these functions.
Vocational training assistance is given in the form of a subsidy which provides
training and living expenses for the eligible individual. The income of the trainee is
considered in determining the subsidy. Unemployed persons, however, who have been
receiving Unemployment Benefits or Unemployment Assistance immediately prior to
entering a vocational program will receive a payment equal to their assistance level
under the Unemployment Benefit or Unemployment Assistance programs.
Vocational retraining is provided for workers who intend to enter or continue in
employment for which contributions to the Bundesanstalt are paid. A further require-
ment is that the applicant be suitable for the program and the intended vocation. Appli-
cants must have worked in covered employment to qualify for a retraining subsidy. The
Promotion Act sets out the formula for determining the amount of the subsidy.
The Promotion Act also authorizes the Bundesanstalt to grant subsidies to ex-
isting or new training establishments (usually non-profit organizations), to employees
leaving one job to begin another, and to employers for hiring workers difficult to place
under normal conditions of the labor market. All of these subsidies are part of a com-
prehensive Incentives To Enter Employment Program. Id. §§ 53-55.
The Promotion Act also establishes special programs for the vocational rehabilita-
tion of handicapped persons. Id. §§ 56-62. These programs offer assistance to the indi-
vidual in recovering from physical or psychological disabilities. The Bundesanstalt
provides subsidies to cover costs of rehabilitation and obtaining a suitable place to work.
In addition to providing financial assistance to the handicapped individual, the
Bundesanstalt also provides funds to training institutions for vocational rehabilitation
services.
3 Id. §§ 63-99. Not to be confused with the Unemployment Benefit or Unem-
ployment Assistance programs, this benefit scheme is created by the Promotion Act to
maintain and create employment opportunities. There are three separate parts to this
program: Short-Time Allowance, Incentives to Year-Round Employment in the Build-
ing Industry and Job Creation Measures.
a. Short-Time Allowance (AFG §§ 63-73)
This benefit is paid to employees during a temporary loss of working hours due to
unavoidable economic causes. The purpose of this program is to allow the employer to
keep experienced workers. The Promotion Act provides that for an employer to qualify,
19871
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5. payments under a program guaranteeing salaries for employees
of bankrupt companies,
39
6. labor market and vocational research,4
7. administration of children's benefits under the Federal Child
Benefit Act,41 and
he must notify the LEO that there will be a loss (1) of more than 10 percent of the
employees' working time, (2) for a continuous time of at least four weeks, and (3) for at
least one-third of the employees in the firm. Employees who have paid contributions to
the Bundesanstalt will be eligible if, as a result of the loss of working hours, they
either suffer a reduction in pay or receive no remuneration. Id. § 65. The normal
duration of the allowance is six months; this period may be increased to 24 months by
decree of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Id. § 67.
For a discussion on short-time compensation in the United States, see Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 3, 1987, at 27, col. 4.
b. Promotion of Year-Round Employment in the Building Industry (AFG §§ 74-
90)
The purpose of this section of the Promotion Act is (1) to increase the activity of
the building industry during the winter months and thus to distribute the capacity of
building firms over the whole year, (2) to counteract price increases in the building
sector, and (3) to maintain employment contracts in the building industry during the
winter in order to prevent disadvantages to building workers due to unemployment.
The Promotion Act provides for subsidies to employers in the form of investment grants
and compensation for additional winter-related costs. Id. §§ 82-87. Subsidies are pro-
vided to employees in the form of a winter allowance. Id. §§ 88-90. The Bundesanstalt
is also authorized by the Promotion Act to grant bad-weather allowances to building
trade workers. This subsidy is in the form of partial compensation for loss of pay days
(from November 1 to March 31) due to bad weather conditions. Under the Promotion
Act, the employer is required to apply for bad-weather allowances.
c. Job-Creation Measures (AFG §§ 91-99)
Section 91 of the Promotion Act authorizes the Bundesanstalt to grant incentives
towards the creation of employment opportunities for unemployed persons. Job-creat-
ing measures may be promoted through subsidies and loans to public or private agen-
cies. The subsidy is a percentage of the remuneration that the referred employee has
received in the newly created job. The Promotion Act states that priority shall be given
to creating stable employment opportunities for unemployed persons, especially to (1)
offset effects of structural changes or technical developments, (2) prepare for, facilitate
or supplement schemes designed to achieve structural improvements, or (3) create em-
ployment opportunities for older employees who have been unemployed for long peri-
ods of time. Id. § 91.
11 Id. § 141b protects employees of insolvent employers. The Promotion Act pro-
vides for bankruptcy compensation that secures the wages of employment prior to the
bankruptcy proceedings. Upon application, bankruptcy compensation is granted by the
LEO for the district in which the employer's wage accounts office for the particular
employee is situated. The amount of compensation is based on unpaid net remuneration
owed to the employee for the three months prior to the institution of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. The funds for this program, which include benefits and administrative costs,
come from employee contributions to the Industrial Injuries Insurance Institute.
40 Another statutory function of the Bundesanstalt is the administration of com-
prehensive labor market and vocational research programs which includes carrying out
surveys of the labor market, provision of statistical data and issuance of reports. Since
1967, these activities have been performed within the Bundesanstalt by the Institute of
Employment Research (IAB). 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 21. For a more in-depth
analysis of the functions of the Institute, see id. at 22-23.
41 Children's benefits are provided in order to relieve the economic burden of faro-
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8. benefits for the unemployed.42
These statutory tasks are intended to contribute to the ultimate
goals of reaching and maintaining a high level of employment and im-
proving the structure of employment, hence promoting economic
growth."' Other goals include the prevention or elimination of unem-
ployment and underemployment, the improvement of the professional
mobility of workers, and the facilitation of employment of the handi-
capped and other persons who have difficulty finding work.
4. BENEFITS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED
Under the Promotion Act, an unemployed worker can receive
funds under the Unemployment Benefit or Unemployment Assistance
programs to replace lost income if he cannot be placed immediately in
suitable employment. 44 The Unemployment Benefit program, which is
financed by compulsory contributions of employers and workers, is
analogous to unemployment insurance in the United States.4'5 The Un-
employment Assistance program is not financed by contributions and is
intended for indigent unemployed workers who are not eligible for the
Unemployment Benefit program.' 8
4.1. Unemployment Benefit Program
4.1.1. General Scope of Coverage
Unemployment Benefit is a compulsory program for all wage
earners and salaried employees regardless of earnings. Analogous to the
U.S. unemployment insurance program, the Unemployment Benefit
program was designed to provide compensation to a worker for the loss
of earnings due to a permanent separation from employment. All
claimants must be capable of work and available for employment. Gen-
erally, the program covers all workers and salaried employees.'"
ilies with children. Bundeskindergeldgesetz, 1982 BGBI.I 13 (W. Ger.). Benefits,
which are based upon need, are tax free and are paid out of federal appropriation. The
program is not part of the unemployment insurance program; it is mentioned here only
because it is administered by the Bundesanstalt.
42 See infra text § 4.
48 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.
44 The statutory purpose of unemployment insurance in the U.S. is to provide
income to the recently unemployed worker while he is seeking new employment. Eco-
nomic Security Act: Hearings on Section 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1935) (statement of Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor)
quoted in California Dept. of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131 (1971).
" AFG §§ 100-133.
46 Id. §§ 134-141.
47 Id. § 168. In addition, the Promotion Act exempts a number of employees from
1987]
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4.1.2. Eligibility
The Promotion Act provides that a person shall be entitled to Un-
employment Benefits if he (1) is unemployed,48 (2) is available for
placement, 9 (3) has completed the qualifying period,50 (4) has regis-
tered with his local employment office (LEO),5 and (5) has applied for
benefits.
52
4.1.3. Amount of Unemployment Benefits
Married workers with at least one child receive Unemployment
Benefits equal to sixty-eight percent of their net remuneration, i.e. re-
contributions and thus from coverage. Id. § 169; see also supra note 14 and accompa-
nying text.
4 The Promotion Act defines an unemployed person as an employee under 65
who is temporarily out of employment. One may be engaged in part-time or self-em-
ployment and still be "unemployed." AFG § 101. Generally, if a person is working less
than 19 hours per week, the person will be considered unemployed. Id. § 102.
" The Promotion Act provides that a person is deemed available for placement if
(1) he is capable of engaging in employment (longer than part-time) under the normal
conditions of the general labor market, (2) he is ready to accept reasonable employment
that he is capable of undertaking and to participate in reasonable activities for the
purpose of professional training, continuing educatiofi and reeducation in order to im-
prove the prospects of employment and vocational rehabilitation, and (3) he is able to
report daily to, and be reached by, the LEO. Id. § 103. One is not entitled to Unem-
ployment Benefits, however, if (1) he is only able to work in a vocational capacity due
to household obligations other than the care for children or others in need of care or (2)
because of his conduct he is not considered employable according to the prevalent un-
derstanding of employment in the labor market. Id.
The Promotion Act further provides that persons unable to fulfill the requirements
of §§ 101-103 may qualify for benefits when, due to a continuing reduction of working
capacity, the worker is unable to undertake more than part-time employment under the
prevailing conditions of the general labor market. Such a determination must be made
by a competent insurance organization. Id. § 105a.
50 A person has completed his qualifying period if he is engaged in covered em-
ployment (i.e., compulsory contributions were made) for 360 calendar days within the
reference period. Id. § 104(1). Periods of employment in which no remuneration is
paid or which precede the date on which he forfeited entitlement to Unemployment
Benefits or Unemployment Assistance, pursuant to a disqualification under Section
119, are not counted toward the qualifying period. Id. § 104(1), (2). The reference
period is a three-year period immediately preceding the first day of unemployment on
which other conditions for entitlement to Unemployment Benefits have been met (e.g.,
registration with the LEO). Id. § 104(2), (3). This period may not overlap any prior
reference period on the basis of which the work had qualified for benefits. Id. § 104(3).
" The unemployed person must register with the LEO and apply for Unemploy-
ment Benefits on his first day of unemployment. If, however, the LEO is closed that
day, he must register on the first day thereafter. If an unemployed worker receiving
benefits fails to register without a valid reason, after a warning from the LEO, he will
be disqualified from receiving benefits for a two-week period. Id. § 120.
52 The duration of entitlement under the Unemployment Benefits program de-
pends upon the period of employment during the reference period. Id. § 106. The
reference period is that period of time (in years) immediately prior to reporting for
benefits:
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muneration less normal and compulsory deductions provided in the In-
come Tax Act.53 All other eligible workers receive Unemployment Ben-
efits equal to sixty-three percent of their remuneration. 4 The benefits
vary, therefore, according to the after-tax earnings of the employee.
The Federal Minister for Labor and Social Affairs determines the per-
centage rates on an annual basis.5
Generally, the basis for determining benefits is the remuneration
received during the last sixty days prior to the worker's separation from
employment."6 This assessment period may vary in certain circum-
stances, such as hardship.57 The net remuneration on which the assess-
ment is based as well as the limits are determined annually by the Fed-
Period of Employment In Years (Before Duration of
(Calendar Days) Registering with Entitlement
the LEO) (Weekdays, not
including Sundays)
240 (seasonal workers 3 78
360 3 104
540 4 156
720 4 208
900 4 260
1080 4 312
1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 50. For example, a worker who was employed in
covered employment for 360 days of a three-year reference period would be eligible for
104 days of benefits; if, however, he had worked 1080 days in the four years prior to
'reporting, he would be entitled to 312 days of benefits.
Effective January 1, 1986, the duration for entitlement to Unemployment Benefits
was extended from 12 months to 16 months for workers over 45 years of age who were
employed for at least four of the last seven years. Workers over 50 who were employed
for at least five of the last seven years are now entitled to up to 20 months of benefits,
and an individual over 55, employed for at least six years, is entitled to benefits for up
to 24 months. AFG § 106a. This measure is intended to address several concerns: first,
older employees, once unemployed, tend to remain unemployed longer than younger
employees; second- the present administration wants to silence the opposition parties
asserting that the administration has failed to stop unemployment; and finally, there
was a desire to relieve local government of the financial burden of public assistance
once former employees exhausted their Unemployment Benefits and Unemployment
Assistance. Doing Business in Europe, supra note 28, 1 40,673, at 41,073-74 (Feb. 13,
1986). It is estimated that this amendment will save local governments from DM 300-
500 million annually. Id. I 40,673, at 41,074 (Feb. 13, 1986).
The Promotion Act does not require a waiting period prior to eligibility for Un-
employment Benefits. Most programs in the United States require a noncompensable
waiting period of one week before unemployment insurance is payable. See infra text §
5.4.
0' AFG § 111(1)(1); see also Einkommensteuergesetz § 32(4), (6), (7), 1985
BGBl.I 977 (W. Ger.) (setting forth what constitutes a "child").
AFG § 111(1)(2).
5 Id. § 111(2).
Id. § 112(3).
5' For example, if the general method of assessment would create undue hardship,
the Promotion Act provides for an alternative method of assessment. Id. § 112(7).
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eral Minister for Labor and Social Affairs. 58
4.1.4. Additional Sources of Income Received by Eligible Workers
Fifty percent of any additional earned income received by a
worker, who is also eligible to receive an Unemployment Benefit,
reduces the amount of the benefit.59 For this purpose, taxes, social in-
surance contributions and professional expenses are treated as deduc-
tions in arriving at net income. However, when the net amount of the
additional earned income plus the Unemployment Benefits equals more
than eighty percent of a worker's previous net income before unemploy-
ment, the additional net income will be fully deducted from the
benefit.60
4.1.5. Suspension of Entitlement
Entitlement to Unemployment Benefits is suspended during any
period in which the unemployed person receives or is entitled to receive
remuneration as a result of previous employment.61 For example, vaca-
tion pay and dismissal compensation or severance pay received when an
employment relationship has been terminated by annulment of the em-
ployment contract will cause a suspension of benefits. Suspension may
not exceed twelve months.6 2 Entitlement is also suspended for periods
when the worker is entitled to receive sick pay, accident benefits, ma-
ternity pay, retraining allowances, certain pension benefits, preliminary
retirement benefits, student benefits and other specified allowances.6 3
4.1.6. Disqualification
An unemployed person may be disqualified from receiving Unem-
ployment Benefits if he (1) terminates his employment relationship or
through his conduct causes his employer to dismiss him, (2) refuses
employment offered him by a LEO, or (3) refuses to participate in or
abandons a program of vocational training."
58 Id. § 175(3).
59 Id. § 115(1). Income not exceeding 30 DM per week is not considered under
the Promotion Act. Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. § 117(1).
62 Id. § 117(3).
6 Id. §§ 118, 118a.
Id. § 119. For a more detailed discussion of disqualifications, see infra text §
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4.2. Unemployment Assistance Program
4.2.1. General Scope of Coverage
Unemployment Assistance is a separate program that also is in-
tended to compensate people who are temporarily unemployed. Al-
though Unemployment Assistance is administered by the Bundesan-
stalt, it is financed by the federal government rather than through
employer and employee contributions. 5 Generally, Unemployment As-
sistance covers the same types of workers that are covered by the Un-
employment Benefit program. 6
4.2.2. Eligibility
With certain exceptions, Unemployment Assistance eligibility re-
quirements are similar to those of the Unemployment Benefit program.
A person is entitled to Unemployment Assistance if he (1) is unem-
ployed, (2) is available for placement, (3) has registered with the LEO
as being unemployed, (4) has applied for Unemployment Assistance,
(5) is indigent, and (6) is not presently entitled to Unemployment Ben-
efits . 7 In addition, in the year preceding the date of registration as
unemployed he must either have been receiving Unemployment Bene-
fits without having forfeited entitlement pursuant to Section 119(3) of
the Promotion Act or he must show that (1) a minimum of 150 calen-
dar days has elapsed since his last entitlement to Unemployment Bene-
fits or (2) at least 240 calendar days have passed since Unemployment
Assistance was terminated pursuant to Section 119(3) of the Promotion
Act." The Promotion Act further provides that Unemployment Assis-
tance is available for those persons who have received public mainte-
nance benefits for at least 240 days within the past twelve months due
to ill health, impaired capacity for employment, or for rehabilitation
purposes and who no longer receive those benefits because the reason
for receiving them no longer exists.6" Eligibility for Unemployment As-
sistance ceases once one becomes entitled to Unemployment Benefits.70
4.2.3. Period of Entitlement
Unemployment Assistance is granted for a maximum of one
65 AFG § 141.
" Compare id. § 134 with id. § 100.
"7 Id. § 134(1)(1)-(1)(3).
*1 Id. § 134(1)(4).
" Id. § 134(3).
10 Id. § 135(1)(1).
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year.71 After one year, eligibility must be reestablished, for example, by
reexamination of the assets and income of the claimant and his
family. 2
4.2.4. Amount of Unemployment Assistance
If the claimant is eligible for Unemployment Assistance immedi-
ately following receipt of Unemployment Benefits, the amount of Un-
employment Assistance is fifty-six percent of the net remuneration used
in determining Unemployment Benefits." The percentage is increased
to fifty-eight percent if the claimant has any children.7 4 In other cases,
the Unemployment Assistance benefit is based upon the wages that the
claimant would receive according to his age, abilities, profession and
training if he were employed.7 5 This wage estimate is adjusted annually
according to the general income levels in the national labor market.
The percentage rates for the Unemployment Benefit program are stipu-
lated for every calendar year by decree of the Federal Minister for La-
bor and Social Affairs.
7 6
Unemployment Assistance and Unemployment Benefits are com-
ponents of a comprehensive program to protect workers who become
unemployed. There is no analog to Unemployment Assistance in the
United States. If a U.S. worker exhausts his unemployment benefits,
his only recourse is public assistance.
5. COMPARISON OF THE FRG AND U.S. PROGRAMS
This part of the article will compare some of the key aspects of the
FRG and U.S. unemployment insurance programs. Although the arti-
cle focuses primarily on disqualification and administrative and judicial
procedure, several other aspects including coverage, contributions, bene-
fit amount, waiting period and duration of benefits will be discussed
also.
5.1. Coverage
The Unemployment Benefit program in the FRG generally covers
all workers employed as wage earners or salaried employees." The
71 Id. § 135(l)(2).
72 Id. § 139a.
7s Id. § 136(l)(1).
74 Id. § 136(1)(2).
75 Id. § 136(2).
76 Id. § 136(3).
7 See supra note 25.
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program also covers apprentices, persons engaged in on-the-job training
and individuals performing military or substitute civilian services. 8
Persons not covered include students, disability recipients, part-time or
temporary employees who are unavailable for regular work on a per-
manent basis, and casual workers; these individuals, however, are also
not required to contribute to the Unemployment Benefits program. 9
In the United States, all employees are covered by unemployment
insurance. 80 Federal law allows states to exclude (1) elected officials,
(2) certain policymakers, (3) members of the judiciary and legislature,
(4) the National Guard, and (5) inmates in penal institutions.8 In
1978, federal law expanded coverage to certain types of employment
including most non-profit employment (non-profit employers with four
or more employees), 82 domestic services,8" agricultural workers," and
state and local government employees.8 5 Students, aliens who are not
permanent residents, and employees of relatives generally are not
covered.8"
As a rule, the coverage in the FRG is broader than in the United
States. The trend in the United States, however, has been towards ex-
pansion of coverage to more classes of workers.
5.2. Contributions
The contribution scheme for the U.S. unemployment insurance
program is quite different from that in the FRG.87 In the FRG, both
the employers and employees are required to contribute.88 The rate -
currently four percent (two percent for employers and two percent for
workers) - is uniform throughout the country and applies to all con-
78 AFG § 168; see also supra note 47.
7. Id. § 169.
80 Introduction, 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 20,000, at 3215 (Sept. 28, 1982).
S 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(7); see 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) % 20,273.03(4), (8)
(Jan. 6, 1986).
82 26 U.S.C. §§ 3304(a)(6), 3309(c); see 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 7
20,275.03 (Mar. 15, 1977).
83 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(2); see 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,165-20,166.03
(Jan. 6, 1986).
84 26 U.S.C. § 3306(k); see 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,255 (June 20,
1973).
85 26 U.S.C. § 3309(a); see 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 20,271, at 3373
(Sept. 14, 1977).
86 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(18); see lB Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) %% 20,230, 20,230A
(Dec. 3, 1985). For information on students employed by schools, see 1B Unempl. Ins.
Rep. (CCH) % 20,192 (Dec. 3, 1985). See also 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) % 20,215
(Dec. 3, 1985) (regarding student nurses and hospital interns).
87 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
88 AFG § 167.
19871
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
tributors. 9 In the United States, however, under most state programs
only employers contribute,90 and the contribution rate varies from state
to state.9 ' A key factor employed by each state program in determining
the contribution rate is the "experience rating" of the employer.92 The
contribution rate imposed by a state varies on the basis of each individ-
ual employer's experience with unemployment. The rationale for this
system is that the cost of unemployment insurance should be paid in
such a way that those employers whose workers suffer the most invol-
untary unemployment should pay at a higher rate than those employers
with less experience with involuntary unemployment. 93
The effect of the experience rating system is that the U.S. system
is adversarial in nature. There is a built in incentive for the employer
to contest claims filed by its workers. Thus, in all unemployment insur-
ance claims, both the employer and the employee, as well as the state
unemployment agency, are interested parties. Each has a right to par-
ticipate in the proceeding, both at the administrative and judicial stages.
In many instances, the employer and the employee are adversaries in
the process. 4 An advantage of the adversary system is that it weeds out
spurious claims by employees. However, the adversary system may
work a disadvantage to claimants with valid claims who are without
resources to adequately represent themselves in the claims process.
In the FRG, an employer's role in the benefits determination pro-
cess is less active. The employer is not a party to the proceedings and
the contribution rate is not affected by the outcome. As a result, the
U.S. employer's costs including both the actual employer contributions
and the procedural costs are greater than those of his counterpart in the
FRG.
5.3. Benefit Amount
In the FRG, the benefit amounts under the Unemployment Bene-
fit and Unemployment Assistance programs are uniform throughout the
country; the only variant is whether the unemployed person has chil-
89 Id. §§ 174, 175; see also supra note 28.
90 For a listing of the states which require employee contributions for unemploy-
ment insurance, see All-State Tax Rates, 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 3000, at
4803 (Jan. 23, 1987).
91 See id.
2 For a discussion of the experience rating system, see id. 11120 (Feb. 13, 1986).
See id. 1 1120, at 4219-2, -3.
See id. at 4224 ("[w]henever an employee receives benefits, those benefits have
to be either charged to the state's fund or to the employer or employers who paid wages
to the employee on the basis of which the benefits were received.").
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dren.95 In the United States, each state has its own method of determin-
ing the benefit amount. For most states the amount is approximately
fifty percent of remuneration.9 6 State laws also provide a maximum and
minimum amount of benefits to be paid an employee in any one week.
As of July 1986, the maximum amount varied from ninety-five dollars
in Puerto Rico to $250 in the District of Columbia.97 With dependency
allowances, the benefit may be as high as $310 per week in Massachu-
setts.98 The minimum benefit amount ranges from five dollars in Ha-
waii to sixty dollars in North Dakota.99
5.4. Waiting Period
Another difference in the FRG and U.S. systems relates to the
waiting period. A waiting period is a noncompensable period of time in
which the worker must have been otherwise eligible for benefits.1 0 0
Most states require a one-week waiting period before benefits are
paid.10 1 In the FRG, there is no waiting period and benefits are paid
upon establishing eligibility. 0 2
5.5. Duration of Benefits
The duration of benefits in the FRG ranges from 78 to 312
days.10 3 In the United States, the duration varies from state to state,
though the common maximum is twenty to twenty-six weeks'O° After
these benefits are exhausted, a U.S. worker may be entitled to thirteen
weeks of extended benefits under the Federal-State Extended Unem-
ployment Compensation Act of 1970.10 A major distinction between
the U.S. and FRG system is that the latter recently has sought to ad-
dress the problem of unemployment of the older worker by increasing
AFG §§ 111(1), 136(1).
*e See 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1910, at 4403-3 (Mar. 11, 1986).
97 Id. 3001, at 4805-16 (July 30, 1986).
98 Id.
9 Id.
100 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CH) 1 1955 (June 9, 1982). In the United States,
eligibility for unemployment insurance is met if: the worker files a claim for benefits;
reports and registers at the local office; is able and available for work; worked in cov-
ered employment, and serves a waiting period. For a discussion of eligibility under the
FRG system, see supra text § 4.1.2.
101 Id. 3001, at 4805-16.
"'2 AFG § 100.
los See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
104 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 3001, at 4805-16 (July 30, 1986).
105 Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act § 202, 26 U.S.C. §
3304 (1982); see also 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 1935, at 4409-2 (Jan. 12, 1987)
(noting that the Federal Extended Benefits Program is funded on an equal basis by
state unemployment compensation accounts and general revenues).
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the duration of benefits for such workers."' 8
5.6. Disqualification
The disqualification provisions of the Unemployment Benefit pro-
gram in the FRG are similar in many respects to state unemployment
insurance programs in the United States. In both countries, for exam-
ple, a worker who voluntarily terminates his employment without
"good cause" is subject to disqualification from benefits. 10 7 The dis-
qualification rules of the two countries will be compared after a sepa-
rate discussion of the fundamental aspects of each.
5.6.1. Disqualification from Benefits in the Federal Republic of
Germany
In the FRG, an unemployed person may be disqualified from re-
ceiving Unemployment Benefits if he either terminates his past employ-
ment relationship voluntarily or causes his own dismissal through his
own misconduct.1 08 Such misconduct may consist of violations of provi-
sions of his employment contract, dishonesty, willful disobedience of or-
ders or rules, repeated negligence or gross negligence.10 Additionally,
an unemployed person who refuses employment offered to him by a
LEO, after being warned of the consequences of refusing the offer, may
be disqualified. 10 Additional reasons for disqualification include: re-
fusal to participate in a vocational training or retraining program after
a warning of the legal consequences of such refusal; voluntary termina-
tion of participation in, or causing dismissal from such a training pro-
gram; or unemployment caused by a labor dispute. 11
An unemployed person will not be disqualified, however, if he ref-
uses employment for a valid reason. Such valid reasons include a re-
fusal because: the wages offered are below those initially agreed to or
are unusually low for the area; the working conditions violate safety
o10 See supra note 52.
107 See infra notes 108, 118 and accompanying text.
108 AFG § 119(1)(1).
109 Id.
110 Id. § 119(1)(2).
an Id. § 119(1)(3), (1)(4). The issue of whether disqualification should occur
when the employment relationship is terminated due to a labor dispute is evaluated by
determining how "dose" the worker is to the dispute. This avoids having to determine
the validity of the dispute itself as well as involving unnecessary authorities not related
to the unemployment insurance program. For an informative comparative discussion of
labor dispute disqualifications in the FRG, the U.K., the U.S. and Ireland, see Note,
Redefining Neutrality: Alternative Interpretations of the Labor Dispute Disqualifica-
tion in Unemployment Compensation, 8 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 89 (1986).
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standards; the work offered is considered contrary to law or principles
of morality; the work arises out of a labor dispute, such as a strike or
lockout; the unemployed person is unable to perform the work offered
due to his mental or physical condition; or the employment would sepa-
rate the person from his family so as to cause economic hardship to the
family unit.'12 Reasons for refusing employment that are not consid-
ered valid include refusal because: the employment offered does not cor-
respond to the person's previous employment, training or general expe-
rience level; the working conditions are less favorable than those at the
person's previous job; or the distance between the place of employment
and the person's home poses an inconvenience." 3
Disqualification from Unemployment Benefits is generally for a
period of twelve weeks from the day after the event that led to the
disqualification.1 14 If it is demonstrated that the event causing disquali-
fication was due to some personal hardship, the disqualification period
may be halved." 5 Once the disqualification period is over, the individ-
ual becomes eligible to receive Unemployment Benefits once again."
a 6
If, however, the individual becomes disqualified again, he forfeits any
benefits to which he otherwise may have become otherwise entitled."17
In order to preserve funds, temporary measures, such as increasing
the disqualification period, have been implemented. Labor has opposed
these measures; their position is that disqualification is punitive in na-
ture and bad for morale. According to the labor unions, the trend to-
wards increased periods of disqualification represents a serious conces-
112 Interview with Dr. Erwin Brocke, President of the Bundessozialgericht, in
Kassel, W. Ger. (Sept. 14, 1984) [hereinafter Brocke Interview].
113 Id.
114 Under a current amendment, effective until December 31, 1989, if an unem-
ployed person causes his own dismissal through misconduct or terminates the employ-
ment without good cause, then he shall be disqualified from benefits for 12 weeks, or
six weeks in case of hardship. AFG § 119a(1). In all other cases, the period of disquali-
fication is eight weeks, or four weeks in case of hardship. Id. § 119a(2). However, of
the approximately 300,000 disqualifications from Unemployment Benefits in the FRG
in 1982, about 90 percent were a result of voluntary termination of employment or
justified employee discharge. Consequently, in most instances, the period of disqualifi-
cation is 12 weeks. A majority of the remaining disqualifications involve invalid refusal
of employment. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, BERICHT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG ZUR ER-
RICHTUNG VON WIDERSPRUCHSAUSSCHOSSEN BEI DER BUNDESANSTALT FOR ARBEIT,
Drucksache 10:442, Sachgebiet 810, 10th Wahlperiode 5 (Oct. 5, 1983) (setting forth a
report by the Bundesanstalt) (copy on file with the author) [hereinafter 1983
REPORT].
5 AFG §§ 119(2), 119a.
116 Id. § 119(1).
117 Id. § 119(3). For example, if a person becomes eligible for benefits and refuses
an offer of employment by the LEO, he will first be disqualified for 12 weeks; if after
reinstatement the person refuses a second offer of employment, he will be permanently
disqualified for the remainder of any benefits then due.
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sion to management. The impact is even more serious when you
consider the increasing number of disqualifications each year. Labor
also opposed the Bundesanstalt's decision not to continue with inde-
pendent administrative review of initial determinations by the local of-
fices. They felt that an independent review would lead to more careful
decisionmaking at the administrative level.
Management disagrees with labor's contention that disqualifica-
tion is punitive. In their view, disqualification is necessary to preserve
the fund for eligible claimants. It is protective rather than punitive.
Management agreed with and advocated the Bundesanstalt's decision
not to implement independent review boards. They questioned its ne-
cessity and felt that it was unjustifiably expensive. In view of the elabo-
rate mechanism for de novo judicial review outlined above, their posi-
tion might be valid.
5.6.2. Disqualification from Benefits in the United States
Since unemployment insurance in the United States is governed
and administered by the individual states, much variation exists as to
what constitutes adequate grounds for disqualification from receipt of
benefits. As noted above, a worker who voluntarily terminates his em-
ployment without "good cause" generally will be disqualified from re-
ceiving benefits. Even though most state statutes also require the re-
jected work to be "suitable work" before disqualifying the person, what
constitutes good cause is defined differently from state to state. s
Similar to the system in the FRG, most states mandate that a per-
son who without good cause falls to either apply for available, suitable
work when directed to do so or return to his position of self-employ-
ment will be disqualified."" These statutes are subject to an overlay of
federal law, however, which limits their ability to deny benefits to
workers in certain circumstances.120 The Federal Unemployment Tax
Act prohibits the denial of benefits to any worker for refusing to accept
work (1) where there is a strike, lockout or other labor dispute at the
118 Several factors are considered in determining whether the employment offered
is suitable. Most states consider: the degree of risk to the person's health; safety and
morality; the degree of physical fitness or prior training necessary as well as that pos-
sessed by the person; any accumulation of prior earnings; the length of any previous
employment; the possibility of securing local work in the person's customary occupa-
tion; and the distance of the available work from his residence. In general, all relevant
factors may be considered in determining whether suitable work has been offered to the
person and whether the reasons for refusal to accept constitute good cause. See 1B
Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1965, at 4428-31 (June 9, 1982).
119 See id. at 4428-29.
120 See id. at 4429-30.
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place where the employment is offered, (2) where the wages, hours or
other basic conditions of employment offered are substantially less
favorable to the worker than those existing for similar work in the area,
or (3) where acceptance of such employment would require the worker
to join a company union or abridge or limit his right to join or retain
membership in any bona fide labor organization.12
As in the FRG, most disqualifications are caused by voluntary ter-
mination of employment or justified discharge. These reasons are fol-
lowed, in frequency, by invalid refusal of suitable work or vocational
training and refusal due to a labor dispute.122
5.6.3. Comparison of Disqualification from Benefits
There appears to be no significant distinction between disqualifi-
cation provisions in the FRG and those in the United States. While the
statutes of both systems mandate that offices at all levels of operation
follow predetermined rules and procedures, both sets of statutes also
allow for much discretion in determining eligibility.
The most notable difference lies in the duration of the disqualifi-
cation period which has been much less in the FRG than in most U.S.
state programs. While the maximum length in the FRG is usually
twelve weeks, 2" in the United States it varies from state to state and
can often result in a complete forfeiture of all benefits."2 Despite oppo-
sition from organized labor, the recent trend in the FRG is toward
increases in the length of the disqualification period.12 6 In addition, af-
ter disqualification in the United States, the person can often only be-
come eligible again for benefits after securing further employment that
lasts for a specified period of time.1 26 Such a penalty generally only
attaches in the FRG after a worker becomes disqualified the second
time.
Without performing a comprehensive study of the administrative
and judicial decisions in both countries it is difficult to assess the overall
impact of disqualification on the labor market in the FRG and the
United States. This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that
121 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3304(a)(5) (1982).
12' See supra note 118.
123 See supra note 114.
124 See 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1965, at 4431 (July 1, 1982).
125 The disqualification period was four weeks, or two weeks in case of hardship,
when the Promotion Act was passed in 1969. It was then amended to increase the
period to eight weeks, or four weeks in case of hardship, before the present amendment,
effective January 1, 1985, to increase the period, in most cases, to 12 weeks, or six
weeks in case of hardship. See supra note 114.
126 See 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1965, at 4431 (July 1, 1982).
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the statutes in each country mandate standards which are very similar,
leading to the result that the majority of disqualifications in both coun-
tries occur due to valid worker discharges and voluntary terminations of
employment.
5.7. Administrative and Judicial Procedure
5.7.1 Administrative and Judicial Procedure in the Federal Republic
of Germany
In the FRG, all claimants for Unemployment Benefits and Unem-
ployment Assistance must file an application with a LEO of the
Bundesanstalt.27 The initial determination of entitlement is the sole
responsibility of the director of the LEO. The decision must be written
and must apprise the claimant of the procedure regarding administra-
tive reconsideration (Widersprfiche) of the initial determination. 128 Un-
less a timely reconsideration is sought, the initial determination is final
and binding.1 29 Claimants seeking to challenge an initial determination,
however, must file a written application for review within one month
from the publication of the initial LEO determination. 30 Representa-
tion by an attorney, union official or other representative is allowed,
and new evidence may be introduced. The reconsideration is carried out
by the director of the LEO, the same person who rendered the initial
determination. After reviewing the entire file, the director may affirm,
modify or reverse the initial determination.
Claimants dissatisfied with the Widersprfiche decision must have
exhausted all administrative review remedies before seeking judicial re-
view in the appropriate Social Court (Sozialgericht)3 This review is
initiated by the claimant's filing a written demand for review within
127 AFG § 146. The procedure governing Unemployment Benefit claims also is
applicable to Unemployment Assistance.
128 SOZIALGESETZBUCH, 10tes Buch, § 36, 1980 BGBI 1 1469 (W. Ger.).
129 Sozialgerichtsgesetz [SGG] § 77, 1975 BGBl I 2535 (W. Ger.). For certain
exceptions in which a hearing is not required, see id. § 78.
130 Id. § 84(1).
131 Id. § 85(3). The Sozialgericht has designated panels (Senat) depending on the
particular aspect of social law. For example, there are separate Senat for unemploy-
ment benefits and assistance, pensions, disability, health insurance and accident
insurance.
The Sozialgericht is comprised of one professional judge and two lay (honorary)
judges (one from labor and one from management). Lay judges are appointed by the
Minister of the State in which the court sits for a four-year term. Judges of the Sozi-
algericht sit on a particular Senat for a certain period of time, although it is not un-
common for judges to move to another Senat after completing their term. Brocke Inter-
view, supra note 112.
[Vol. 9:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss2/2
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS
one month of the Widersprilche determination."' 2 The parties at this
stage are the claimant and the local office. Again, representation is al-
lowed. The timely application for review operates to suspend the prior
decision.""3 The Sozialgericht hears new evidence through witnesses
and documents. 1 3 An oral hearing may be convened or the case may be
submitted through the introduction of written papers.135 The claimant
may ask the court to subpoena the former employer;" 6 however, absent
a subpoena, the employer is neither a party to the proceeding nor pre-
sent at the hearing.137 In certain situations, the court may issue a deci-
sion without a hearing (Vorbescheid).138 If the claimant requests a
hearing after a Vorbescheid, the court will grant a hearing; if no hear-
ing is sought, the court's decision if final and binding. In most cases,
however, the court will hear the case and render a decision (Urteil).139
Of course, some cases may be negotiated out of court (Vergleich)1" or
withdrawn by the claimant (Rficknahme).1 " Negotiated settlements
and withdrawals are final and binding.
Parties dissatisfied with the Sozialgericht verdict may ask the
court for leave to appeal the decision to the State Supreme Court for
Social Jurisdiction (Landessozialgericht) 2 having jurisdiction over the
case. This second level review must be initiated in writing within thirty
days from the date of mailing of the Sozialgericht's decision.143 Repre-
sentation is permitted. The appellant may be the claimant or the Re-
gional Employment Office.1 " In certain instances (for example, if less
than thirteen weeks of benefits are involved), the appeal may not be
allowed.14 5 If the Landessozialgericht accepts the appeal, a de novo
132 Id. § 87(1).
133 Id. § 97.
134 Id. § 106.
23 Id. § 108.
13 Id. § 106(3)(4).
113 Brocke Interview, supra note 112. The employer is not a party at the adminis-
trative level either.
a1s SGG § 105.
139 Id. § 125.
140 Id. § 101.
141 Id. § 102.
142 Id. § 143. There are nine Landessozialgerichts in the FRG. Each Landessozi-
algericht Senat is comprised of three professional judges and two lay judges (one from
labor and one from management). The lay judges are appointed for a four-year term by
the Minister of the State. Brocke Interview, supra note 112.
143 SGG § 151(1).
144 If the Sozialgericht finds for the claimant, the LEO notifies the appropriate
REO, which decides whether to appeal the decision. Factors considered in determining
whether to appeal include the potential cost and the significance of the issue. Brocke
Interview, supra note 112.
145 SGG § 144(1)(2).
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hearing is held.14 6 Again, the claimant may testify and present new
evidence or the case may be submitted on written papers.,
At the Landessozialgericht hearing, the examination of witnesses
is carried out by the court and not by the parties or their representa-
tives. This also applies to proceedings in the Sozialgericht. (Actually, a
nonadversarial process exists throughout the entire FRG judicial sys-
tem.) After receiving testimony, oral and written argument and docu-
ments, the Landessozialgericht renders a decision.
A party dissatisfied with the decision of the Landessozialgericht
may seek leave to appeal to the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialger-
icht).48 As a general rule, the Landessozialgericht must approve the
appeal.1 9 If the Landessozialgericht allows the appeal, the Bundes-
sozialgericht must accept it. It is possible, however, that the Bundes-
sozialgericht will grant the appeal notwithstanding a denial by the
Landessozialgericht.150 In any event, appellant must submit a written
request for appeal within thirty days of the Landessozialgericht ver-
dict."' Representation is required before the Bundessozialgericht.'
52
There is no new evidence received by this court, and after careful re-
view, a decision is rendered.
On rare occasions, and upon recommendation of the Bundessozi-
algericht, the decision will be reviewed by the Grosse Senat. The
Grosse Senat is comprised of the Presiding Judge of the Bundessozi-
algericht, six other professional judges from various senates (e.g., un-
employment, social security, war victim relief) and four honorary
judges (two from labor and two from management).,15  The Grosse
Senat will hear cases only when there has been a conflict between dif-
ferent senates in the Bundessozialgericht.'" The Presiding Judges of
the two conflicting senates must sit on the Grosse Senat that hears the
146 Id. § 157.
147 Id.
148 Id. § 160. The Siebte Senat of the Bundessozialgericht is in charge of judicial
review of administrative action/inaction in matters concerning the Promotion Act. This
Senat consists of three professional judges and two lay judges (one from labor and one
from management). The lay judges are appointed for a four-year term by the Federal
Minister of Labor. Brocke Interview, supra note 112.
149 Id. § 161(1). In certain situations, an appeal may proceed directly from the
Sozialgericht to the Bundessozialgericht bypassing the Landessozialgericht. This accel-
erated appeal, called Sprungrevision, occurs in significant cases (e.g., mass appeals,
cases of first impression affecting many individuals). Id. § 161.
.50 The petitioner may file a motion challenging the Landessozialgericht's denial,
giving the Bundessozialgericht discretion to review the case. Id. § 160(a)(4).
151 Id. § 164(1).
252 Id. § 166(1).
153 Id. § 41(1).
15 Id. §§ 42, 43.
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dispute. In cases involving constitutional issues (e.g., religious freedom,
equal protection), the Grosse Senat, like every other panel of the
Bundessozialgericht, must refer the case to the Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).155
5.7.2. Comparison of Administrative and Judicial Procedures
There are several key differences in the FRG and U.S. systems
with regard to administrative and judicial procedure. First, in the
United States, the employer is an interested party in all unemployment
insurance claims that involve that employer.15 ' Therefore, in the
United States, employers, employees and the state unemployment
agency alike may all seek administrative and judicial review. In the
FRG, only the employees and the Bundesanstalt are parties to the pro-
ceedings, and therefore, only they may seek review. 57
A second distinction relates to administrative review. Under the
FRG system, there is no independent administrative review of initial
determinations by the LEO. An initial determination of a claim can be
reconsidered upon timely request by the claimant,""8 but this reconsid-
eration is carried out by the same LEO director who was responsible
for the initial determination. Claimants who are dissatisfied with the
reconsideration determination must proceed directly to judicial
review.
15 9
The U.S. system contains a more involved administrative review
process.16 As in the FRG, the initial determination is made by a local
office. 61 However, in the U.S., claimants or employers dissatisfied with
the determination may appeal the decision to a state administrative tri-
bunal. 11 2 This tribunal is called a board of review in many states.
These boards are independent components of a state unemployment
system and usually are comprised of three members - one appointed
from labor, one from management, and a neutral member. Upon a
timely appplication for appeal, the board will appoint a referee, usually
a full-time employee of the board, to conduct a hearing. 6 This hear-
155 Id. § 39(2).
156 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
1" See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
as5 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
160 See 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (OCH) 2020, at 4543-44 (Sept. 9, 1986).
161 See id. at 4541-42.
161 Social Security Act § 303(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1982) (requiring that
state unemployment insurance laws provide an opportunity for a fair hearing before
"an impartial tribunal" for all individuals whose claims for unemployment benefits are
denied).
16 See 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 2020, at 4543 (Sept. 9, 1986).
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ing, attended by the employer and the claimant, allows for presentation
of new evidence, testimony by the parties and their witnesses, and cross
examination.'" After the hearing, the referee will render a decision. In
some states this decision is final and the only review allowed is to the
courts.'60 In about half the states, however, a dissatisfied party may
seek further review with the board.' After the board's determination
of this second level appeal, the decision is final and may be appealed
only to the courts. 
1 7
The FRG system of administrative review has not always been
dependent on the same LEO director to render both the initial determi-
nation and any appeal taken therefrom. In 1979, a project was under-
taken in which Section 119 determinations of the LEOs were reviewed
not by the Chief of the LEO, but instead by an independent committee.
Each committee consisted of three members - one from labor, one
from management and one from the Bundesanstalt. Upon timely writ-
ten request by the claimant, individual committees, not the chief of the
LEO, would review the entire record of the LEO determination of the
claim and render a decision. During the three-year experiment, over
6,600 committee sessions were conducted.' At each session between
four and twenty-two cases were presented.' In 1983, the Bundesan-
stalt submitted a report recommending the project be abolished and, as
a result, the committee system was abandoned.1
7 0
Organized labor has favored the committee system. It contended
that all areas of social law except unemployment benefits had such a
system. Additionally, it maintained that (1) such a system would
strengthen the autonomy of the LEOs, (2) that it would improve the
quality of the LEO determination process, and (3) would allow for
greater uniformity of decisions and greater acceptance of LEO deci-
sions.17' Labor underscored that during the experiment, Widersprfiche
involving Section 119 disqualifications were reduced from nineteen per-
cent to 14.7 percent of the total number of Widersprlche.1
7 2
114 See id. at 4544.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 Interview with Dr. Hans V. Lipke, Administrative Specialist in Unemploy-
ment Insurance with the Bundesanstaltfir Arbeit, in Nuremberg, W. Ger. (Sept. 6,
1984) [hereinafter cited as Lipke Interview].
169 Id.
170 1983 REPORT, supra note 114, at 10.
171 DEUTSCHER GEWERKSCHAFrSBUND BUNDESVORSTAND, PROTEST GEGEN DIE
BESEITIGUNG DER WIDERSPRUCHSAUSSCHOSSE, BERICHT AN DEN BUNDESTAG, NEUE
VERWALTUNGSRATSENTSCHEIDUNG N6TIG (Feb. 1983) (report by national labor
council objecting to the removal of the committee system).
171 Interview with William Adamy, Advisor for the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
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Management, on the other hand, vigorously opposed the commit-
tee system. It is believed that the LEO director, acting independently,
would be likely to grant fewer benefits. The reasons given included: (1)
internal changes in the present system could remedy the serious
problems; (2) the decrease in Section 119 appeals were not due to the
experiment but rather to external factors; (3) the committee system
causes a greater delay in the Widersprfiche process; (4) the committee
system was too expensive; and (5) the committees were quasi-judicial in
nature and constituted an intrusion on the judicial process.17 3 Perhaps
the most significant argument of the employers was that there was only
a four percent disparity between the committee decisions and the LEO
decisions.174 Labor's response to this was that the committee system it-
self was the reason for the low variance between initial determinations
and the committee reconsideration determinations (i.e., the LEOs knew
they were being watched and thus were more careful in their
decisionmaking).
17 5
In any event, the committee system was abandoned and today
Widersprfiche is once again carried out by the chief of the LEO that
issued the initial determination. Today Bundesanstalt statistics reveal
that Widersprilche is utilized by claimants more than ever. From 1970
to 1985, the number of Widersprilche cases increased from 51,800 to
334,569 (approximately a 600% increase).178 In 1983, 32.5% of the
Widersprfiche cases resulted in total victory for the claimant and 3.4%
of the cases represented a partial victory.177 No similar statistics were
available for 1984 and 1985. In 1970, there were 3,617 appeals to the
Sozialgericht (7.0% of the Widersprilche), while in 1985 there were
33,847 appeals (10.1% of the Widersprlche).17 18 In 1985, there was a
584.6% increase in Widersprilche over the 1970 level; over the same
period there was an 945.9% increase in appeals to the Sozialgericht
(34,214 cases), 630.9% increase in appeals to the Landessozialgericht
(3104 cases) and 367.9% increase in appeals to the Bundessozialgericht
(401 cases). 179 These statistics reveal an ever-increasing dissatisfaction
on the part of claimants with the decisions of the LEOs and the courts.
Bundesvorstand, in Diisseldorf, W. Ger. (Sept. 12, 1984) [hereinafter Adamy
Interview].
17S Interview with Reinhard Ebert, Senior Administrator with the Bundesver-
einigung der Deutschen ArbeitgeberverbiTnde, in Cologne, W. Ger. (Sept. 12, 1984).
174 Id.
'17 Adamy Interview, supra note 172.
176 BUNDESANSTALT FOR ARBErr, GESCHXFTSBERICHT (1985 and earlier
editions).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
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The third major distinction between the FRG and U.S. systems
lies in the procedure for judicial review of agency determinations. The
judicial review process in the FRG seems to favor labor. The claimant
is entitled to two separate de novo hearings in both the Sozialgericht
and the Landessozialgericht.80 Further judicial review by the Bundes-
sozialgericht is permitted although the hearings are not de novo. 8 1
Moreover, the judges are specialists in unemployment insurance law
and it appears that there is thorough review of the administrative
decisions.
In the U.S., state procedures do not allow for de novo judicial
review of final board decisions."' 2 Of course, such review is generally
not permitted until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. 8
Depending upon particular state laws, a dissatisfied party may appeal
to the courts - in most states the court of general jurisdiction.
184
Under the U.S. system, the court's review is limited to a review of the
administrative record, and it will not consider any evidence, either in
the form of testimony or documents."85 The court may remand the case
to the board. The scope of judicial review is limited in nature; usually
the only question before the court is whether the agency determination
is against the manifest weight of the evidence or is contrary to law.
Thus, the system of judicial review in the United States is far less rig-
orous than its counterpart in the FRG. Interestingly, based on the dis-
cussion above, administrative review is far less rigorous in the FRG.
6. CONCLUSION
The Bundesanstalt administers a comprehensive and innovative
program to promote employment in the FRG. With increasing unem-
ployment, a greater emphasis has been placed on the Unemployment
Benefits component of the program which, in theory, is supposed to be
one of many measures designed to combat unemployment and carry out
the intent of the Promotion Act. With increased rates of unemployment,
more pressure is put on the benefit structure. Today more than two-
thirds of the Bundesanstalt's budget is earmarked for benefits.188
Claims are increasing and more workers are contesting their disqualifi-
180 See supra text § 5.7.1.
181 See supra text § 5.7.1.
182 See 1B UnempI. Ins. Rep. (CCH) % 2020, at 4544 (Sept. 9, 1986).
183 Id.
18 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-8(M) (1978).
185 See 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) % 2020, at 4544 (Sept. 9, 1986).
18e LUpke Interview, supra note 168.
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cations each year.187There is little doubt that what was originally in-
tended to be a social benefit program is evolving into an insurance sys-
tem, much like that in the United States, with an increased emphasis
on eligibility and disqualification. If the level of unemployment and the
pressures on the Unemployment Benefit system continue, it seems
likely that the temporary measures, such as the increase in the disquali-
fication period, will become permanent and the FRG program will be-
come more and more similar to its U.S. counterpart.
167 Id.
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